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Int J Audit. 2018;22:25–39.The internal audit literature suggests that firms can gain significant added value from internal
audit in terms of improving governance processes, reducing audit fees, and detecting fraud.
Nonetheless, not all firms use internal audit. A growing literature examining the determinants
of internal audit has identified a number of different determinants, such as firm size, strong
commitment to risk management, existence of an audit committee, and an independent board
chair. This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the effects of ownership
structure on the voluntary use of internal audit. The logistic regression model of this study is
based on data from 107 firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. It shows that ownership
structure is a significant determinant of internal audit. Specifically, the paper shows that foreign
ownership, dispersed ownership, and state ownership increase the likelihood of a firm using
internal audit.
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The internal audit function has become a central part of corporate
governance (Carcello, Hermanson, & Raghunandan, 2005; Goodwin,
2004; Paape, Scheffe, & Snoep, 2003; Sarens, 2009). Past accounting
scandals, such as Enron, Parmalat, Ahold, and Lehman Brothers, have
emphasized the role of the internal audit as a crucial corporate
function. It has been argued that effective internal audits might have
helped these firms to avoid such scandals (Arena & Azzone, 2007; Lenz
& Sarens, 2012). While the internal audit function provides significant
benefits to organizations in terms of improving governance processes
(The Institute of Internal Auditors [IIA], 1999; Coram, Ferguson, &
Moroney, 2008), detecting fraud (IIA, 1999; Coram et al., 2008; Ege,
2015), and reducing audit fees (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2012; Coram
et al., 2008; Felix, Gramling, & Maletta, 2001; IIA, 1999; Prawitt, Sharp,
& Wood, 2011), it seems that less than half of firms voluntarily choose
to use internal audit. There is a nascent literature—known as literature
on the determinants of the internal audit—that explores the reasons for
such behavior (Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006). The existing literature
has shown that the use of internal audit is associated with factors such- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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finance industry (including banks, credit unions, and insurance compa-
nies), audit committees, and independent board chairs (Goodwin‐Stew-
art & Kent, 2006).
Meanwhile, little is known about the effects of the ownership
structure of firms on the use of internal audit. This can be considered
a significant research gap, given that prior research has indicated
ownership structure to be a central factor in explaining corporate
behavior in general (Burkart, Gromb, & Panunzi, 1997; Desender,
Aguilera, Crespi, & García‐Cestona, 2013; Prevost, Rao, & Hossain,
2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). This paper
contributes to the existing literature by addressing this research gap.
Specifically, we investigate how different aspects of ownership
structure seem to affect the voluntary use of internal audit. In this
study, using internal audit means a firm establishing its own internal
audit function or purchasing internal audit services from an external
service provider. The analysis of the paper is based on data from 107
Finnish firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. The firms listed on
the exchange provide a meaningful sample for the purpose of this
research, since the use of internal audit is voluntary in Finland. In- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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26 RÖNKKÖ ET AL.addition, firms listed on the exchange must announce a corporate
governance statement and define the organization of their internal
audit or explain if they have not established an internal audit (Securities
Market Association, 2015). In contrast, firms that are listed, for
example, on the New York Stock Exchange are mandated to arrange
internal audit activities no later than the first anniversary of the
company's listing date (New York Stock Exchange, 2016).
The results of the study are based on a logistic regression model.
They show that the structure of ownership seems to affect the use
of internal audit. The results suggest that three out of the four
ownership factors that are explored in this paper tend to increase
the likelihood of the voluntary use of internal audit: state ownership,
foreign ownership, and dispersion of ownership. Furthermore, the
results of this study suggest that firm size, organizational complexity,
board gender diversity, liquidity, profitability, and growth seem to
affect voluntary use of internal audit. However, in contrast to previous
studies exploring this theme (Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006), this
study relied on prior studies that have used total number of employees
as a measure of firm size (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Andres & Theissen,
2008; Arnegger, Hofmann, Pull, & Vette, 2014; Beck, Demirgüc‐Kunt,
& Maksimovic, 2005; Connell, 2001; Hu, 2003; Shalit & Sankar,
1977). It should be noted that, when using an amount of total assets
as a measure of firm size, the results related to ownership variables
change to a degree. When total assets were used as a measure of firm
size, the ownership determinants did not receive statistically
significant coefficients. Naturally, this raises some questions about
how the way of measuring firm size shapes the results showing the
effects of ownership structure on the voluntary use of internal audit.
At the same time, it establishes a fruitful basis for further research
examining the effects of ownership structure on the voluntary use of
internal audit.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
empirical starting point for the analysis; Section 3 positions the paper
in the internal audit and ownership structure literature, and introduces
the theoretical framework and hypothesis development. Section 4
introduces the data, sample selection, and model specification. Section
5 presents the results. Finally, Section 6 presents our conclusions and
the limitations of the study, and makes suggestions for future research.2 | THE INTERNAL AUDIT PROFESSION
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REGULATION IN FINNISH FIRMS
The first internal auditors were recruited to Finnish companies in the
1930s (Kuuluvainen, 2016). The 1970s and 1980s were a period of
fast growth and internationalization in internal auditing in Finland,
and the number of IIA Finland members topped 300 for the first time
in history (Kumpusalo, 1996). In the early 1990s, the Finnish economy
suffered from a deep economic crisis, and this also negatively affected
the number of internal auditors (Kumpusalo, 1996). The accounting
scandals in the USA and Europe in the early 2000s turned the trend
back on track, and internal audit is slowly starting to find its way as a
crucial part of Finnish companies' governance systems. In 2016, IIA
Finland had approximately 700 active members (IIA Finland, 2016).The corporate governance regulation of listed firms in Finland is
still evolving. The first corporate governance recommendation in
Finland was published in 1997 by the Central Chamber of Commerce
and the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers (Securities
Market Association, 2010). The aim of the recommendation was to
clarify the corporate governance practices applied by Finnish compa-
nies. In 2010, the Securities Market Association of Finland published
the Finnish Corporate Governance Code, which aims to ensure that Finn-
ish listed companies apply high‐quality corporate governance prac-
tices. The Securities Market Association is a cooperation body
established by the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK), the Central
Chamber of Commerce of Finland, and the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki
Ltd. Corporate governance of listed companies in Finland is based on
a combination of laws, the Rules of the Helsinki Stock Exchange, the
regulations issued by the Financial Supervisory Authority, and the
Finnish Corporate Governance Code (Securities Market Association,
2015). The most essential legal provisions are included in the Limited
Liability Companies Act (624/2006), the Securities Markets Act
(746/2012), the Auditing Act (1141/2015), and the Accounting Act
(1336/1997). Internal audit is not required by any of these acts or
regulations. However, the Finnish corporate governance recommenda-
tion (Hex Plc et al., 2003) and the Finnish Corporate Governance Code
(Securities Market Association, 2010, 2015) introduce internal audit
as an important part of good corporate governance and propose that
listed firms arrange internal audit on a voluntary basis.
Finnish listed companies use a one‐tier corporate governance
model consisting of the general meeting, the board of directors, and
the managing director (Securities Market Association, 2010). Very few
Finnish listed companies have supervisory boards (Securities Market
Association, 2010). Finland as a member state of the EU has adopted
Art. 41 of the 8th European Company Law Directive. The 8th Directive
assigns the oversight duty regarding the internal audit function to the
audit committee. In Finland, the transposition of the 8th Directive into
national codewas done alongwith the definition of an audit committee.
According to the Finnish Corporate Governance Code (Securities Market
Association, 2010), the extent of a company's business may require the
establishment of an audit committee. The audit committee monitors
the efficiency of the company's internal control, internal audit, and risk
management systems, among other tasks. Companies that do not
establish an audit committee shall assign these duties to the board or
to some other committee. The International Standards for the
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing accepted by the Institute of
Internal Auditors (IIA, 2012) state that, in order to achieve the degree
of independence necessary to effectively carry out the responsibilities
of the internal audit activity, the chief audit executive should have
direct and unrestricted access to both senior management and the
board. Furthermore, the standards suggest that the necessary degree
of independence can be achieved through a dual‐reporting relationship
with the board and senior management. As an example of functional
reporting to the board, the standards present the board approving
decisions regarding the appointment and removal of the chief audit
executive. Conclusively, the board or its audit committee makes
decisions on the use of internal audit. The maintenance of the internal
audit function is the responsibility of the chief audit executive, who is
appointed and removed by the board or its audit committee.
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setting of this study for several reasons. First, internal audit is not
obligatory for firms listed in Helsinki (Securities Market Association,
2010). Second, the state is a significant investor in listed Finnish firms
(La Porta, Lopez‐De‐Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Löyttyniemi, 2011).
Third, NASDAQ OMX Helsinki is a rather small open market where
foreign capital has been a growing source of finance since 1993,
when the market was opened to foreign investors (Oikarinen,
2010). In addition, NASDAQ OMX Helsinki is a suitable setting for
the study because of the availability of detailed data. The empirical
data for this study were mainly collected manually by us from
companies' corporate governance statements, investor relations
web pages, and financial statements. Ownership data were also
drawn from Euroclear Finland's databases. Some ready‐calculated
financial indicators were drawn from the databases of Balance
Consulting Oy, a private financial data service provider, in order to
complete the financial data.
3 | THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
There is a well‐established literature that explores the effects of
ownership structure on firm behavior. It has conclusively shown that
the structure of ownership is a major determinant of firm behavior.
The literature has demonstrated that it is associated with factors such
as corporate governance (Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Desender et al., 2013;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), firm performance (Burkart et al., 1997;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), board composi-
tion (Rediker & Seth, 1995; Prevost et al., 2002; Bozec & Bozec, 2007),
board remuneration (Dogan & Smyth, 2002), firm value (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Selarka, 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Slovin &
Sushka, 1993; Perrini, Rossi, & Rovetta, 2008), dividend policies
(La Porta, Lopez‐De‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000), investor protec-
tion (La Porta, Lopez‐De‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998), and
mergers and acquisitions activities (Coates, 2010), among others.
However, there is little information on how the structure of ownership
affects the use of internal audit.
Currently, the theoretical discussion on the determinants of the
internal audit is rather limited (Wallace & Kreutzfeldt, 1991; Carey,
Simnett, & Tanewski, 2000; Goodwin & Kent, 2004; Carcello et al.,
2005; Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006). Prior research has investigated
voluntary demand for internal audit (Carey et al., 2000; Goodwin &
Kent, 2004; Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006; Wallace & Kreutzfeldt,
1991), factors affecting internal audit budgets (Carcello et al., 2005),
and the size of the internal audit function (Anderson et al., 2012). A
large portion of the prior literature concerning the determinants
affecting organizations' decisions to voluntarily arrange audit activities
concerns external audits (Chow, 1982; Carey et al., 2000; Knechel,
Niemi, & Sundgren, 2008). Prior studies suggest that company size is
a relevant determinant affecting the existence of internal audit
(Wallace & Kreutzfeldt, 1991; Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006). The
determinants of the internal audit examined have included a wide
range of factors, such as the complexity of the firm, board composition,
audit committee activity, risk management (Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent,
2006), management control (Wallace & Kreutzfeldt, 1991), industry,external audit fee, solvency (Carcello et al., 2005), profitability, and
liquidity (Wallace & Kreutzfeldt, 1991; Carcello et al., 2005). However,
prior discussion has disregarded the influence of corporate ownership
structure on the use of internal audit.
The dominant theoretical framework explaining the existence of
internal audit has been agency theory (Adams, 1994; Carey et al.,
2000; Carcello et al., 2005; Goodwin & Kent, 2004; Goodwin‐Stewart
& Kent, 2006; Mihret, 2014). Agency theory suggests that share-
holders as principals and managers as agents may have diverging
interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, the reasons for companies
to arrange audit activities can relate to conflicts of interest among
managers, shareholders, and bondholders (Abdel‐Khalik, 1993;
Anderson, Francis, & Stokes, 1993; Carey et al., 2000; Chow, 1982;
DeFond, 1992; Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006). Agency theory sug-
gests that managers tend to have more information about the
organization's operations and finances than the owners do (Adams,
1994). The owners thus might aim to mitigate this information asymme-
try in order to ensure that agents' decisions are not harmful to principals'
interests, or agents might incur bonding costs in order to signal to the
principals that they are acting responsibly and in line with the principals'
interests (Adams, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Information
asymmetries might also exist between senior managers and lower level
managers (Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006). It can thus be suggested
that senior management may delegate their internal control responsibil-
ities to internal audit (Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006). Taken together,
internal audit can theoretically be seen as a monitoring cost incurred by
owners or a bonding cost incurred by managers (Adams, 1994).
The assurance and management consulting roles of internal audit
have also been recognized by the International Standards for the
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing reviewed and developed by
the IIA (2012). Moreover, the standards suggest that internal audit
activity must be independent (IIA, 2012). In order to achieve the
necessary degree of independence, the standards state that the chief
audit executive should have direct and unrestricted access to both
the senior management and the board (IIA, 2012). This can be achieved
through a dual‐reporting relationship with the board and the
management (IIA, 2012). However, the dual‐reporting structure also
causes problems, as the internal audit tries to serve two masters. As
an example of functional reporting to the board, the standards
(IIA, 2012) present the board approving decisions regarding the
appointment and removal of the chief audit executive. This could also
be seen as a mechanism to strengthen the independence of the
internal audit from the senior management and as a mechanism to
strengthen the relationship between the internal audit and the board
of directors. Conclusively, the connection between internal audit
and the board representing the shareholders is recognized both
theoretically and in practice.
Modern publicly listed corporations typically have multiple share-
holders. These principals with various identities and backgrounds
might also have conflicting interests as they try to maximize the value
of their investments in the corporation (Davis, Schoorman, &
Donaldson, 1997). Thus, owners might aim to mitigate these informa-
tion asymmetries as well, not just the information asymmetry between
themselves and managers. The existing literature suggests that
different ownership structures can affect the information asymmetry
28 RÖNKKÖ ET AL.between owners as principals and managers as agents (Ettredge,
Simon, Smith, & Stone, 1994; Menon & Williams, 1994; Collier &
Gregory, 1999). Prior studies suggest that internal audit is considered
to be a potential solution for information asymmetries between the
management and owners (Anderson et al., 1993; Carey et al., 2000;
DeFond, 1992). Considering the board of directors' or its established
audit committee's strong influence as representatives of shareholders
on the decision to use internal audit in a company, the limited literature
that explores the effects of ownership structure on the use of internal
audit can be questioned. Our study addresses the paucity of research
concerning solutions for these agency conflicts by examining the effects
of ownership structures on the use of internal audit. However, the
relationships between senior management, the different types of
owners, and their possible representatives on the board are complex
(Brown, Beekes, & Verhoeven, 2011). Thus, this study must
acknowledge the possibility of endogeneity and reversed causality when
interpreting the relationship between different types of ownership
structures and the use of internal audit (Antle, Gordon, Narayanamoorthy,
& Zhou, 2006; Brown et al., 2011; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010).
Prior ownership literature has introduced various ownership
factors that affect a firm's behavior, such as the voting power of the
largest shareholder (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), government
ownership (La Porta et al., 1999; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), foreign
ownership (Dahlquist & Robertsson, 2001), and management
ownership (Tauringana & Clarke, 2000). Meanwhile, the existing
corporate governance literature has examined relations between
different corporate governance mechanisms and ownership determinants,
such as ownership concentration (Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Kim,
Kitsabunnarat‐Chatjuthamard, & Nofsinger, 2007), foreign ownership
(Leuz, Lins, & Warnock, 2010), dispersed ownership, and director
ownership (Collier & Gregory, 1999).
This paper highlights foreign ownership, state ownership, disper-
sion of ownership, and the influence of a single powerful shareholder
as potential ownership structure‐related determinants that affect the
use of internal audit. These determinants are based on prior studies
(Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, & Matos, 2011; Carey, Knechel, & Tanewski,
2013; Collier & Gregory, 1999; Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Trevis
Certo, 2010; Ennser‐Jedenastik, 2014; La Porta et al., 1999; Leuz et al.,
2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000).3.1 | Foreign ownership
Among other phenomena, foreign ownership (Leuz et al., 2010) has
been suggested as a determinant that increases information
asymmetry between owners and managers, and consequently
increases the demand for monitoring. The prior literature argues that
agency conflicts become greater as a company shifts further from its
owners' control (Carey et al., 2000; Collis, Jarvis, & Skerratt, 2004;
DeFond, 1992). The existing literature suggests that the major reasons
influencing firms to arrange audit activities relate to agency conflicts
between managers and shareholders (Abdel‐Khalik, 1993; Carey
et al., 2000; Chow, 1982). It has also been suggested that the
geographical diversification of owners can lead to an informational
disadvantage for foreign investors (Leuz et al., 2010). Furthermore,
several studies indicate that insider owners and the management canuse their control over the company to gain private control benefits at
the expense of other shareholders ( Leuz et al., 2010; Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997; Stulz, 2005; Zingales, 1994). It has also been noted that
the management might use a variety of techniques against foreign
shareholders in particular, such as declaring shares illegal, causing
problems with bringing up issues in shareholder meetings, and losing
voting records (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Foreign investors might not
have sufficient power to protect their voting rights in the same manner
as domestic investors with better access to other shareholders and the
law courts (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance
mechanisms, including arranging internal audit activities, should
provide foreign owners with assurance to protect their investments
(Leuz et al., 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Stulz, 2005). Only some
of the foreign investors could have access to internal audit reports
through representatives in the board or its audit committee, as the
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal
Auditing (IIA, 2012) state that the chief audit executive should have a
dual‐reporting relationship with the board and senior management.
However, management might invest in internal audit in order to signal
to the shareholders that they are acting responsibly and in line with the
shareholders' interests (Adams, 1994).
Leuz et al. (2010) suggest that foreign investors avoid investing in
companies with poor governance. Poor corporate governance is likely
to increase the monitoring costs faced by foreign investors and
consequently reduce the return on invested capital (Leuz et al.,
2010). Monitoring is required in order to hinder managers and
controlling owners from providing opaque financial information and
earnings management (Leuz Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). Consequently,
this might affect the demand for internal audit as management shifts
further from the foreign owners' control (Adams, 1994; Carey et al.,
2000; Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006).
Aggarwal et al. (2011) state that foreign institutional investors
export good corporate governance practices and have a significant role
in improving governance. Furthermore, foreign institutional investors
seem to affect which corporate governance mechanisms are in place
in companies they have invested in (Aggarwal et al., 2011). Exporting
good governance should protect the shareholder rights of foreign
investors when insiders tend to pursue their own interests (Stulz, 2005;
Leuz et al., 2010). These findings might indicate that companies with a
high foreign ownership stake use internal audit as part of a high‐quality
governance system, while several studies have recognized the internal
audit as a central part of corporate governance (Carcello et al., 2005;
Goodwin, 2004; Paape et al., 2003; Sarens, 2009). An internal audit
might provide potential added value to foreign institutional owners
by ensuring reliable financial reporting when managers might aim to
misrepresent the firm's performance for their own benefit
(Leuz et al., 2003). This study complements prior research by investi-
gating whether the use of internal audit as a central part of corporate
governance is connected to the proportion of company shares owned
by foreign investors. Given these arguments, we expect a higher
foreign ownership percentage to be positively associated with the
use of internal audit. This leads to the following hypothesis:H1. The higher the foreign ownership percentage, the
higher the probability that a firm uses internal audit.
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A growing body of literature has been exploring the behavior of state‐
owned enterprises. Several prior studies have noted that state owner-
ship is a crucial factor affecting a firm's behavior (Connelly et al., 2010;
Ennser‐Jedenastik, 2014; La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny,
1994). The prior ownership literature argues that states may pursue
possible political objectives using state‐owned firms (La Porta et al.,
1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). The potential agency problem in
state‐owned listed companies is that managers may not run the com-
pany as intended by politicians, and the achievement of political objec-
tives might be endangered. Furthermore, agency theory suggests that
financiers, such as shareholders, have difficulties in assuring the spend-
ing of their funds by management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Thus, pol-
iticians might have an interest in applying risk management and an
effective internal control system as part of a high‐quality corporate
governance structure in order to find out whether the funds have been
used as intended (Carey et al., 2013).
The Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development's
([OECD's], 2004) Principles of Corporate Governance introduces internal
audit as an important part of good corporate governance. These
principles aim to develop professional and ethical behavior in order to
stabilize financial markets and economic growth. Several member
countries have introduced their own policies for steering the activities
of state‐owned companies. Among other countries, the Finnish Prime
Minister's Office (2011) has published a state ownership policy for
the daily steering activities of state‐owned companies. The policy
outlines that state‐owned companies are expected to be familiar with
both domestic and foreign corporate governance codes. In addition,
the policy makes it clear that state‐owned companies are expected to
comply with the best practices of corporate governance as presented
by the codes. Thus, the board or its audit committee might signal to
the government owner that it pursues to comply with the best practices
of corporate governance by using internal audit. On the other hand, the
statemight pursue appointing a representative to the board of directors
and affect the use of internal audit through that board member.
Both the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004)
and the Finnish Corporate Governance Code (Securities Market
Association, 2010) introduce internal audit as an important part of
good corporate governance. Therefore, we expect that state
ownership has a positive effect on the voluntary use of internal audit.
This leads to the following hypothesis:H2. If the state is an owner of a listed company, there is
a higher probability that the firm uses internal audit.3.3 | Dispersion of ownership
As the investor base of a firm grows, the separation of ownership and
control increases (Carey et al., 2013). Consequently, there are consid-
ered to be more complicated traditional agency conflicts in entities
with larger owner bases (Carey et al., 2013; Collier & Gregory, 1999).
In companies with many investors, owners are often smaller and poorly
informed of their control rights (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Therefore,
dispersion of ownership—and the separation of ownership and control
this can create—might create a demand for audit (Carey et al., 2013).The prior literature states that dispersed ownership commits
shareholders to lower levels of monitoring and control (Burkart et al.,
1997). An internal audit might be one solution to guarantee the
shareholders' interests in companies with larger owner bases, by
reducing agency conflicts between managers and minor shareholders
(Adams, 1994; Carey et al., 2000; Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006).
Corporate governance researchers have realized that, in addition
to the traditional depiction of the agency model, this theory has other
implications (La Porta et al., 1998; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, &
Jiang, 2008). The principal–principal theory suggests that conflicts of
interest might exist between different sets of principals, such as con-
trolling shareholders and minority shareholders (Dharwadkar, George,
& Brandes, 2000; Young et al., 2008). These conflicting interests
between owners with various identities and backgrounds might occur
as they try to maximize the value of their investment (Davis et al.,
1997). Thus, an internal audit might also be established in order to
mitigate information asymmetries between different owners. Further-
more, it must be noted that several smaller blockholders might work
together and enhance their control, as information asymmetries exist
between different groups of owners (Connelly et al., 2010). The possi-
ble collaboration between smaller blockholders might exist to the
extent to which their interests are aligned (Connelly et al., 2010). This
is to be recognized, as the prior literature suggests that the presence of
several smaller blockholders is actually more common than the
presence of a single majority blockholder (Maury & Pajuste, 2005). In
this study, the dispersion of ownership is measured by the total num-
ber of shareholders. This paper addresses the discussion of ownership
dispersion and the separation of ownership and control by testing the
total number of shareholders in relation to internal audit. We expect
dispersed ownership to be positively associated with the use of inter-
nal audit. The following hypothesis is therefore tested:H3. The more dispersed the ownership structure, the
higher the probability that a firm uses internal audit.3.4 | Influence of a single powerful shareholder
In the prior ownership literature, voting rights in firms, and especially
the voting rights of the principal shareholders, are acknowledged as a
determinant of corporate behavior and performance (La Porta et al.,
1999; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). In addition, the existing gover-
nance literature argues that large shareholders have a central role in
corporate governance (La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986,
1997). Large shareholders are further introduced as active decision‐
makers in corporate governance issues (La Porta et al., 1999; Connelly
et al., 2010). Ownership concentration among large shareholders is
also considered a governance mechanism as such (Kim et al., 2007).
The Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act (624/2006) is based
on strong principles and promotes a strong ownership role. One of
the main principles is that of majority rule, which states that decisions
are based on the majority vote. Strong shareholders also have other
rights in listed firms in Finland. According to the Finnish Limited
Liability Companies Act, shareholders owning no less than 10% of
the company's shares have particular rights, such as demanding an
extraordinary general meeting to be called to address a specific issue,
demanding a minority dividend to be distributed, bringing an action
TABLE 1 Expected logistic regression results
Variable Variable type Expected sign
PROFIT Control +
SOLV Control +
LIQUID Control +
GROWTH Control +
SIZE Control +
GENDER Control ?
AUDITCOM Control +
INDEP Control +
COMPL Control +
DAYS Control +
INDUSTRIALS Control ?
CONSGOODS Control ?
TECHNOLOGY Control ?
CONSSERVICES Control ?
BASICMATER Control ?
FINANCIALS Control ?
OTHERS Control ?
MAJOR Independent −
STATE Independent +
FOREIGN Independent +
DISPER Independent +
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that a special audit be carried out. Taking on board these arguments,
NASDAQ OMX Helsinki provides a suitable environment to examine
a single powerful shareholder's influence on firm behavior, such as
the voluntary use of internal audit.
Prior studies suggest that ownership concentration can be seen as
a substitute for other control devices and decrease the need for
corporate governance mechanisms, and this situation is especially
found in European social democracies pressing firms to favor employ-
ment instead of invested capital (Roe, 2003; Bozec & Bozec, 2007).
Furthermore, the substitution effect argument suggests that a powerful
controlling shareholder increases monitoring by owners and conse-
quently decreases the benefits of other governance mechanisms
(Bozec & Bozec, 2007), in which internal audit function is suggested
to be an important element by previous studies (Carcello et al., 2005;
Goodwin, 2004; Paape et al., 2003; Sarens, 2009). In addition, the
existing literature has examined relations between ownership concen-
tration and other corporate governance mechanisms, such as board
independence (Kim et al., 2007), and board turnover (Franks & Mayer,
2001). Kim et al. (2007) present a negative relation between higher
ownership concentration and independent members of the board.
Other findings also state that concentrated ownership or the existence
of large blockholders increase direct monitoring of, and interference in
management by, the shareholders (Burkart et al., 1997; Connelly et al.,
2010). Blockholders are also suggested to have incentives to enjoy
benefits not shared with minority shareholders (Connelly et al.,
2010). These findings suggest that a high ownership concentration
might decrease the need for or interest in an improved internal control
system, and accordingly the emphasis on using internal audit when the
owner's observability of the management's actions increases; see
Carey et al. (2000), Collier and Gregory (1999), Collis et al. (2004),
and DeFond (1992). We therefore explore the effects of a single pow-
erful shareholder on the use of internal audit. In this study, the voting
power of the largest single shareholder describes the concentration of
ownership. This variable is based on the prior literature (Bozec &
Bozec, 2007; Kinkki, 2008; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Despite
arguments suggesting that a dominant shareholder might have greater
incentive to implement good corporate controls, we draw on evidence
from previous studies (Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Kim et al., 2007; Roe,
2003) and expect concentration of ownership to be negatively
associated with the use of internal audit. This leads to the following
hypothesis:H4. The stronger the voting power of the largest share-
holder, the lower the probability that a firm uses internal
audit.The hypotheses of the potential ownership structure‐related
determinants affecting the use of internal audit are presented inTable 1.4 | EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
4.1 | sample selection
Our statistical analyses are based on an original sample of 121 firms
listed on the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki in 2012. The original samplewas reduced by 14 firms. Four banks and one insurance company were
excluded because their financial indicators were not comparable to the
other sample firms. The banks and the insurance company did not pro-
vide current ratio information in their financial statements. Nine firms
were further excluded to eliminate incomplete information. Three of
these did not report the return on equity ratio and three others did
not report the current ratio in their financial statements. Two of the
excluded firms were registered in Sweden and reported according to
Swedish legislation. One excluded firm did not report the number of
independent members on the board. As a result, the final sample
consisted of 107 firms. The dataset was collected from multiple
sources. First, we used corporate governance statements to draw out
information on the use of internal audit, and the composition of the
boards of directors and audit committees. Second, the financial indica-
tors of solvency, liquidity, and profitability were collected from the
financial statements of the firms. Information on personnel was also
collected by the authors from the firms' financial statements. Third,
we drew some ready‐calculated financial indicators concerning reve-
nues generated by foreign operations from the databases of Balance
Consulting Oy, which is a local private financial data service provider.
The growth information, measured by change in revenues, was also
drawn from the databases of Balance Consulting Oy. Fourth, the num-
ber of days that a firm had been publicly listed on NASDAQ OMX
Helsinki was gathered from the Finnish online newspaper
Kauppalehti.fi's database. The sources of the collected variables are
presented in Table 2.
Fifth, we gathered the ownership structure data concerning
major shareholders and the total number of shareholders from the
investor pages of the sample firms. Sixth, we used the databases of
TABLE 2 Sources of the collected data
Variable Variable type Data source
IAUDIT Dependent Corporate governance statement
PROFIT Control Financial statement
SOLV Control Financial statement
LIQUID Control Financial statement
GROWTH Control Balance Consulting's database
SIZE Control Financial statement
GENDER Control Corporate governance statement
AUDITCOM Control Corporate governance statement
INDEP Control Corporate governance statement
COMPL Control Balance Consulting's database
DAYS Control Kauppalehti.fi database
INDUSTRIALS Control NASDAQ Helsinki official website
CONSGOODS Control NASDAQ Helsinki official website
TECHNOLOGY Control NASDAQ Helsinki official website
CONSSERVICES Control NASDAQ Helsinki official website
BASICMATER Control NASDAQ Helsinki official website
FINANCIALS Control NASDAQ Helsinki official website
OTHERS Control NASDAQ Helsinki official website
MAJOR Independent Investor pages of a firm
STATE Independent Prime Minister's office Finland's
website
FOREIGN Independent Euroclear Finland's database
DISPER Independent Investor pages of a firm
RÖNKKÖ ET AL. 31Euroclear Finland to complete the ownership data by drawing out
ready‐calculated information on foreign ownership. Seventh, the
industry sector root code information was collected from NASDAQ
Helsinki's official website. Finally, we collected information on state
ownership from the website of the Ownership Steering Department
of the Finnish Prime Minister's Office. We checked the collected data
manually for completeness and accuracy. In addition, the corporate
governance statements and financial statements used for data
gathering were audited by the authorized public accountants of the
listed companies.
4.2 | Model specification
Since the dependent variable (IAUDIT) is a binary variable, we chose to
estimate the following logit regression model to examine the effects of
determinants of the voluntary use of internal audit:
IAUDIT ¼ b0þ b1PROFITþ b2SOLVþ b3LIQUIDþ b4GROWTH
þb5SIZEþ b6GENDERþ b7AUDITCOMþ b8INDEP
þb9COMPLþ b10DAYSþ b11MAJORþ b12STATE
þb13FOREIGNþ b14DISPERþ e
(1)
whereIAUDIT = 1 if a firm uses internal audit by establishing its own
internal audit function or purchasing internal audit
services from an external service provider, other-
wise IAUDIT = 0 ;PROFIT is the profitability—that is, return on equity mea-
sured as net income divided by shareholders'
equity;SOLV is the solvency—that is, equity ratio measured as
total equity divided by total assets;LIQUID is the liquidity— that is, current ratio measured as
current assets divided by current liabilities;GROWTH is the change in revenues (percent) from financial
year 2011 to financial year 2012;SIZE is the logarithm of firms' total personnel;GENDER = 1 if a board has a female member, otherwise GEN-
DER= 0 (all boards had at least one male member);AUDITCOM=1 if a firm has an audit committee, otherwise
AUDITCOM=0 ;INDEP is the share of independent members on the board
of directors;COMPL is the revenues generated by a firm's foreign oper-
ations in relation to total revenues;DAYS is the number of days that a firm has been publicly
listed on NASDAQ OMX Helsinki;MAJOR is the share of ownership of the largest shareholder
(0–100%);STATE = 1 if the state is a shareholder of the firm, otherwise
STATE = 0 ;FOREIGN is the share of foreign shareholders out of total
shareholders (0–100%);DISPER is the logarithm of total number of shareholders.IAUDIT, the dependent variable of the model indicates whether a
firm uses internal audit. It received a value of 1 if the firm used internal
audit, or 0 otherwise. A similar measure was used by Goodwin‐Stewart
and Kent (2006).
The model included four ownership‐specific independent variables
that were drawn from different data sources. First, it included the
share of ownership of the largest shareholder (MAJOR), which reflects
the influence of a single powerful shareholder. This was measured as
the share of voting power of the largest shareholder (0–100%). The
same measure has been used in prior literature (Bozec & Bozec,
2007; Kinkki, 2008; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Information on the
largest shareholder was drawn from the firms' investor pages. Second,
the model included a state ownership variable (STATE), which indi-
cated whether the Finnish government has an ownership stake in the
sample firm. This was measured as a binary variable based on existing
literature (Lu, Thangavelu, & Hu, 2016; Rugman, 1983). It had a value
of 1 if the government was a shareholder of the firm, or 0 otherwise.
The Finnish government has traditionally been rather active in owning
firms with a strategic interest, such as energy producers, oil refiners,
and aviation companies. In 2012, it had holdings in 15 such firms that
were listed on NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. Third, the dispersion of own-
ership was measured as a logarithm of the total number of share-
holders (DISPER). A similar measure of dispersion has been used in
past research literature (Collier, 1993; Cooke, 1989; Lloyd, Jahera, &
Page, 1985; Rozeff, 1982). Fourth, the model included a variable that
measured the effect of foreign ownership (FOREIGN) on the likelihood
32 RÖNKKÖ ET AL.of using internal audit. This was measured as the share of foreign
shareholders out of total shareholders (0–100%).
Themodel also included a group of control variables. The prior liter-
ature has suggested that financial performancemight have an impact on
the ability of firms to invest in internal audit (Carcello et al., 2005;
Wallace &Kreutzfeldt, 1991). That is to say, good financial performance
might increase the likelihood of firms investing in internal audit. Given
this argument, we controlled for the financial performance of firms in
themodel on three fundamental levels (Altman, 1968): (i) we formulated
a variable of profitability (PROFIT), which was measured as the operat-
ing profit margin of the firms; (ii) we constructed a variable of liquidity
(LIQUID), which was measured as the current ratio of the firms; and
(iii) we formulated a variable of solvency (SOLV), measured as the equity
ratio. The financial performance information was drawn from the finan-
cial statements of the firms. In addition to financial performance, a num-
ber of other control variables were included in the model. The prior
research indicates that organizational complexity might lead to greater
decentralization and a greater demand for monitoring (Carcello et al.,
2005), causing pressure on firms to use internal audit. It was therefore
controlled in this study as well. The prior internal audit literature has
identified several company characteristics that reflect organizational
complexity and greater decentralization, such as proportion of foreign
subsidiaries, number of subsidiaries, or number of business segments
(Carcello et al., 2005). We chose the ratio between the revenues of
foreign operations and total revenues as a measure of complexity
(COMPL), owing to data availability. A similar measure has been used
in past research literature (Desender et al., 2013). It was expected to
be positively related to the use of internal audit.
Prior studies have also suggested that firm size is an important
determinant of the use of internal audit (Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent,
2006), and the existence of an internal audit department (Wallace &
Kreutzfeldt, 1991) and internal audit budgets (Carcello et al., 2005;
Anderson et al., 2012); large firms are more likely to use internal audit,
for example. This was therefore controlled in the model. Prior studies
have introduced proxies of size such as total assets (Anderson et al.,
2012; Carcello et al., 2005; Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006) or total
revenues (Wallace & Kreutzfeldt, 1991). Nevertheless, the professional
literature states that the use of internal audit is importantly related to
number of employees, among other factors (Securities Market Associ-
ation, 2010, p. 24). There is also evidence that the internal audit effec-
tiveness literature suggests that the ratio between the number of
internal auditors and the number of total employees in a company is
a significant determinant of internal audit effectiveness (Arena &
Azzone, 2009). We therefore constructed an employee‐related size
variable (SIZE), which was measured as a logarithm of the number of
total personnel. This is a well‐established measure that has been used
in a number of prior studies (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Andres &
Theissen, 2008; Arnegger et al., 2014; Beck et al., 2005; Connell,
2001; Hu, 2003; Shalit & Sankar, 1977). It is also generally used for sta-
tistical purposes to classify firms based on their size; for example, sta-
tistical offices across Europe use it to determine firm size (Eurostat,
2017). However, it must be noted that the robustness of our model
is sensitive to the size proxy.
It has been suggested that the existence of an audit committee
and an independent board chair are associated with the use ofinternal audit (Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006). Prior research sug-
gests that the existence of an audit committee demonstrates a
demand for internal audit quality (Abbott, Parker, Peters, & Rama,
2007), and that director independence is related to an effective
monitoring environment (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carcello & Neal,
2000). We formulated a binary variable to measure whether a firm
had an audit committee (AUDITCOM). It had a value of 1 if the firm
had a committee, or 0 otherwise. This was expected to be positively
associated with the use of internal audit. Furthermore, we formed a
variable to measure the independence of board members (INDEP),
which was measured as the share of independent members on the
board of directors. A high share was also expected to have a positive
effect on the likelihood that a firm used internal audit. We also con-
trolled for whether the fact that a board has both genders repre-
sented has an impact on the use of internal audit. Prior research
suggests that board‐level gender diversity improves governance and
monitoring over a homogeneous board (Abbott, Parker, & Presley,
2012b). However, we did not have any expectations about the rela-
tion between board gender diversity and use of internal audit. The
establishment of an audit committee, having independent members
on the board, and having both genders represented on the board
are all recommended by the Finnish Corporate Governance Code
(Securities Market Association, 2010).
We also controlled for the number of days a firm has been listed
on the stock exchange. It was expected that a long history increases
the likelihood that a firm uses internal audit. Finally, the existing litera-
ture suggests that industry‐specific determinants are associated with
the existence of an internal audit function (Goodwin & Kent, 2004;
Wallace & Kreutzfeldt, 1991) and internal audit budgets (Carcello
et al., 2005). Drawing on these findings, we classified the firms into
seven groups according to NASDAQ Helsinki's sector root codes.
The sectors examined in this study are industrials, consumer goods,
technology, consumer services, basic materials, financials, and, due to
the low number of observations, “others,” including oil and gas, health
care, telecommunications, and utilities.1 We also collected information
on external audit service providers in order to control for Big 4 compa-
nies. The Big 4 variable had to be excluded from the regression model
due to the fact that all except two of the companies in our model had a
Big 4 company as an external auditor. Correlations of the variables are
presented in Table 3.5 | RESULTS
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in
the regression model. It shows that as many as 41.1% of the sample
firms had used internal audit (IAUDIT).2 Furthermore, 59.9% of the
sample firms had decided not to use internal audit. The sample firms
explained the reasons for not using internal audit in their corporate
governance statements, as suggested by the Finnish Corporate
Governance Code (Securities Market Association, 2010). Company
size, stage of development and operational scope of the company,
and purchasing of larger external audit services, among others, were
presented as reasons for not implementing internal audit. Our figure
is relatively close to previous findings on the voluntary use of
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RÖNKKÖ ET AL. 33internal audit. Based on their Australian sample, Goodwin‐Stewart
and Kent (2006) found that 34.1% of firms voluntarily used internal
audit.
In the following we summarize the descriptive statistics for the
independent variables used in the model. The share of foreign owner-
ship in the sample firms was 19.1% on average, ranging from 0.01 to
90.8% (FOREIGN). The proxy for ownership dispersion received a
value of 3.9, which indicates that the sample firms had 17,691 share-
holders on average (DISPER). As normal values, the range of number
of shareholders was 247 to 224,204. The descriptive statistics further
indicate that 12.2% of the sample firms were partly owned by the state
(STATE). The Finnish government has, among its financial interests,
invested in firms with a special strategic interest, such as energy
producers, oil refiners, and aviation companies. In 2012, the Finnish
government had holdings in 15 such firms listed on NASDAQ OMX
Helsinki. Table 4 also shows that, on average, the voting power of
the largest shareholder in the sample firms was 26.0% (MAJOR). This
value ranged from 2.1 to 78.9%. The correlations are presented in
Table 3.
Table 5 presents the logistic regression results. The area under the
ROC curve for the logistic regression model is 0.9531. Table 6 presents
the logistic regression results of a separated model with only the inde-
pendent variables, and Table 7 presents the logistic regression results
of a separated model with only the control variables. The results indi-
cate that ownership structure matters when it comes to the use of
internal audit. Three out of four ownership‐related determinants
appeared to be statistically significant. First, DISPER received a posi-
tive and statistically significant coefficient (p < . 05), indicating that
the more shareholders the firm has the more likely it is to use internal
audit; in other words, dispersed ownership seems to increase the like-
lihood that a firm uses internal audit. This result is in line with our
hypothesis stating that dispersed ownership might increase the need
for internal audit as the separation of ownership and control increases.
Second, as expected, FOREIGN also received a positive and significant
coefficient (p < . 05). This suggests that a high share of foreign owner-
ship seems to increase the probability that a firm uses internal audit on
voluntary basis. The result matches our hypothesis. Third, as hypothe-
sized, STATE also had a statistically significant positive coefficient
(p < . 05). This indicates that state ownership increases the probability
that a firm uses internal audit. The result is in line with national and
international policies suggesting that state‐owned companies are
expected to comply with the best practices of corporate governance.
MAJOR received an insignificant coefficient, so the voting power of
a major individual shareholder does not seem to have any significant
impact on the use of internal audit. In addition, our model included a
number of control variables, and many of them received statistically
significant coefficients.
As expected, SIZE received a positive and statistically significant
coefficient (p < . 05).3 The result is in line with the prior literature
(Carcello et al., 2005; Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006; Wallace &
Kreutzfeldt, 1991). However, it should be noted that this study used
a logarithm of the total number of employees as a proxy of size. With
alternative proxies of size, total assets or total revenues, the ownership
determinants did not receive statistically significant coefficients. As
expected, COMPL had a positive and significant coefficient (p < . 05).
TABLE 4 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
IAUDIT 107 .4112 .4943 .0000 1.0000
PROFIT 107 −5.4344 121.19 −985.85 580.80
SOLV 107 44.960 19.875 −64.000 93.800
LIQUID 107 1.8368 4.2842 0.0800 44.340
GROWTH 107 0.9953 25.503 −149.9 89.7
SIZE* 107 3.0663 0.8454 0.0000 4.5852
GENDER 107 .8411 .3673 .0000 1.0000
AUDITCOM 107 .5607 .4986 .0000 1.0000
INDEP 107 .7177 .2251 .0000 1.0000
COMPL 107 44.582 37.706 0.0000 99.800
DAYS 107 6,246.8 3,025.2 1,011.0 25,811.0
MAJOR 107 25.987 18.043 2.0800 78.900
STATE 107 .1215 .3282 .0000 1.0000
FOREIGN 107 19.068 21.848 0.0100 90.770
DISPER** 107 3.8637 0.6009 2.3927 5.3506
*SIZE (normal values) 107 4,406.5 7,232.6 1.0000 38,477
**DISPER (normal values) 107 17,691 29,527 247 22,4204
Yes (%) No (%)
INDUSTRIALS 39 61
CONSGOODS 13 87
TECHNOLOGY 16 84
CONSSERVICES 8 92
BASICMATER 8 92
FINANCIALS 8 92
OTHERS 8 92
TABLE 5 Logistic regression results
Variable Variable type Expected sign Coefficients z‐value p‐value
PROFIT Control + 0.040 1.44 .075*
SOLV Control + 0.030 0.79 .215
LIQUID Control + −1.872 −2.48 .007***
GROWTH Control + −0.0449 −1.53 .063*
SIZE Control + 2.300 1.87 .031**
GENDER Control ? −2.406 −1.66 .048**
AUDITCOM Control + −1.142 −1.09 .138
INDEP Control + −1.738 −0.72 .236
COMPL Control + 0.023 1.97 .025**
DAYS Control + −0.000 −0.85 .198
MAJOR Independent − 0.012 0.40 .345
STATE Independent + 3.290 1.72 .043**
FOREIGN Independent + 0.040 1.69 .046**
DISPER Independent + 2.757 2.15 .016**
Number of obs 107
Pseudo R2 .604
Log likelihood −28.709
*p < . 1 ,
**p < . 05 ,
***p < . 01 ; p‐values are one‐tailed.
34 RÖNKKÖ ET AL.The more complex the organization's structure is, the more control it
tends to require. Identical results have been found in prior studies
(Carcello et al., 2005; Wallace & Kreutzfeldt, 1991). GENDER receiveda negative and also statistically significant coefficient (p < . 05),
although we had no expectations on this. Nevertheless, the result sug-
gests that if a firm's board has both female and male directors it is more
TABLE 6 Logistic regression results, independent variables only
Variable Variable type Expected sign Coefficients z‐value p‐value
MAJOR Independent − 0.003 0.26 .398
STATE Independent + 1.961 1.74 .041**
FOREIGN Independent + 0.021 1.97 .025**
DISPER Independent + 1.994 3.52 .000***
Number of obs 107
Pseudo R2 .293
Log likelihood −51.221
*p < . 1 ,
**p < . 05 ,
***p < . 01 ; p‐values are one‐tailed.
TABLE 7 Logistic regression results, control variables only
Variable
Variable
type
Expected
sign Coefficients
z‐
value p‐value
PROFIT Control + 0.036 1.88 .030**
SOLV Control + −0.006 −0.19 .423
LIQUID Control + −0.946 −1.72 .043**
GROWTH Control + −0.027 −1.38 .084*
SIZE Control + 1.677 2.96 .002***
GENDER Control ? −0.304 −0.32 .376
AUDITCOM Control + 0.838 1.28 .101
INDEP Control + 0.272 0.19 .426
COMPL Control + 0.118 1.46 .073*
DAYS Control + 0.000 0.15 .441
Number of obs 107
Pseudo R2 .408
Log likelihood −42.937
*p < . 1 ,
**p < . 05 ,
***p < . 01 ; p‐values are one‐tailed.
RÖNKKÖ ET AL. 35probable that the firm does not use internal audit. In contrast to our
expectation, LIQUID received a negative and significant coefficient
(p < . 001), so the results seem to indicate that poor liquidity tends to
increase the likelihood of the use of internal audit. GROWTH also
received a negative and significant coefficient (p < . 1), in contrast to
our expectation. The results of this study suggest that lower growth
rates of total revenues seem to increase the likelihood of the voluntary
use of internal audit. As expected, PROFIT had a positive and statisti-
cally significant coefficient (p < . 1). So, the logistic regression results of
this study seem to indicate that if a firm is more profitable it is more
probable that the firm has voluntarily used internal audit. All of the
other control variables received statistically insignificant coefficients.6 | CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The importance of the role of internal audit in good corporate gover-
nance is widely recognized. However, despite the potential benefits
and suggestions from regulators, less than half of the firms examined
seem to have voluntarily used internal audit. We further noted that
while there are a few studies that have investigated the determinantsof internal audit, the effects of ownership structure on the use of inter-
nal audit have remained quite unexplored. This was considered a sig-
nificant research gap, considering that prior research has indicated
that ownership structure tends to shape the behavior of firms (Bozec
& Bozec, 2007; Dogan & Smyth, 2002; La Porta et al., 2000; Prevost
et al., 2002; Rediker & Seth, 1995). The ownership determinants exam-
ined in this study include foreign ownership, state ownership, disper-
sion of ownership, and the influence of a single powerful shareholder.
From a research perspective, five important conclusions can be
drawn based on the statistical analyses of this study. First, the owner-
ship structure in general seems to affect the use of internal audit.
According to our analysis, three out of four ownership‐related determi-
nants are statistically significant, which indicates that ownership struc-
ture is related to the voluntary use of internal audit. The results of this
study are in line with prior literature suggesting that ownership struc-
ture does affect corporate governance (Bozec & Bozec, 2007;
Desender et al., 2013; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Second, as hypothe-
sized, state ownership increases the likelihood that a firm uses internal
audit. This finding has a solid theoretical basis, as several prior studies
have noted that state ownership is a crucial factor affecting a firm's
behavior (Connelly et al., 2010; Ennser‐Jedenastik, 2014; La Porta
et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Furthermore, prior literature sug-
gests that politicians might have an interest in using internal audit as
part of a high‐quality corporate governance system in order to find
out whether the funds have been used as intended (Carey et al.,
2013). Third, as we hypothesized, our results indicate that the more
dispersed the ownership structure is the more likely it is that the firm
uses internal audit. The dispersion of ownership was measured by
the total number of shareholders. This finding has a solid theoretical
basis; it is believed that internal audit might be one solution to guaran-
tee shareholders' interests in firms with dispersed owner bases by
reducing the information asymmetry between managers and minor
shareholders (Adams, 1994; Carey et al., 2000; Goodwin‐Stewart &
Kent, 2006). However, it must be noted that, to the extent to which
their interests are aligned, several smaller blockholders might work
together and enhance their control, as information asymmetries exist
between different groups of owners (Connelly et al., 2010). This is to
be recognized when interpreting the effects of dispersed ownership
on the use of internal audit. Fourth, as hypothesized, we discovered
that a high share of foreign ownership increases the likelihood of the
use of internal audit. This finding is in line with suggestions that foreign
36 RÖNKKÖ ET AL.investors avoid investing in companies with poor governance (Leuz
et al., 2010). On the other hand, investors such as foreigners or the
state might be willing to affect the use of internal audit after the
investment decision. As suggested by the prior corporate governance
literature, this must be recognized when interpreting the results of this
study (Brown et al., 2011). Finally, our analysis does not support the
theory that powerful, concentrated shareholders might decrease the
emphasis on using internal audit when the owner's observability of
management increases; see Carey et al. (2000), Collier & Gregory
(1999), Collis et al. (2004), and DeFond (1992). However, we suggest
further examination of this hypothesis in different market settings.
The results of this study indicate an association between the size
of the firm and the use of internal audit. The result is in line with prior
literature (Wallace & Kreutzfeldt, 1991; Carcello et al., 2005;
Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006). As suggested in existing literature,
in light of the findings of this study it can be speculated that smaller
firms might not regard internal audit as being cost effective
(Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006). However, as an important limitation,
it should be noted that the robustness of our model is sensitive to the
size proxy, total number of employees. In addition to firm size, other
organizational characteristics should be recognized when examining
the potential determinants of the voluntary use of internal audit. Con-
sistent with prior studies, we found an association between the com-
plexity of the organization's structure and the use of internal audit
(Carcello et al., 2005; Wallace & Kreutzfeldt, 1991). Our results indi-
cate that more complex organizations seem to require more control
in the form of internal audit.
From a practice perspective, the results provide regulators,
management, boards, and investors with a comprehensive outlook on
the voluntary use of internal audit in listed companies. The results of
this study might be useful for market regulators that are considering
making internal audit mandatory. This paper provides useful informa-
tion on determinants affecting firms' decisions to voluntarily use inter-
nal audit and widens the discussion to ownership determinants. Thus,
management and boards can obtain useful information from the results
of this study when making decisions on whether to use internal audit.
Our results suggest that certain types of investors, such as foreigners,
tend to be shareholders in companies that use internal audit. More-
over, higher foreign ownership seems to increase the likelihood that
a firm decides to use internal audit. This might be due to the prior
findings stating that foreign owners export good corporate governance
(Aggarwal et al., 2011). Internal audit might also help a company in
attracting new foreign shareholders, as they might be more willing to
invest in companies with internal audit. Furthermore, officers
preparing and implementing governmental ownership policies can ben-
efit from the results of this study, as they suggest that state ownership
seems to increase the likelihood that a company uses internal audit.
The result suggests that state owners seem to implement internal audit
in firms they invest in. This result is in line with OECD (2004) and the
state ownership policy guidelines of the Finnish Prime Minister's
Office (2011), suggesting that state‐owned companies comply with
the best practices of corporate governance. Furthermore, the Finnish
Corporate Governance Code (Securities Market Association, 2010) also
introduces internal audit as an essential part of good corporate gover-
nance. Thus, state‐owned companies listed on NASDAQ OMXHelsinki seem to comply with the best practices of corporate gover-
nance. From the investors' point of view, investors such as foreigners
and minor investors might gain useful information from the results of
this study when selecting potential investment targets, as this study
suggests that these different types of investors tend to prefer compa-
nies which use internal audit. In addition, the results of this study pro-
vide useful information for internal audit practitioners, as our results
indicate that, despite the potential benefits, less than half of the sam-
ple firms voluntarily used internal audit. In light of these findings, it
can be speculated as to whether the internal audit is really seen as a
crucial part of high‐quality corporate governance systems, as sug-
gested by corporate governance regulation.
Some further limitations to this study should be noted. Despite it
being rather comprehensive, our data were based on a single year
and included firms listed on a single market. We believe that a larger
multiyear dataset might bring useful new information into the evolving
research field of examining the determinants affecting the voluntary
use of internal audit. We also encourage researchers to further exam-
ine these phenomena on larger stock exchanges and in different coun-
tries with various corporate governance systems. This paper
contributes to the internal audit research field by introducing four
dimensions of company ownership structure. However, new aspects
of ownership structure are needed in order to build a deeper under-
standing of internal audit determinants. Among the possible variables
to consider are management ownership, board ownership, and institu-
tional ownership. Furthermore, some of the variables used in the
model might not be good proxies for the determinants measured. In
particular, in contrast to previous studies exploring the voluntary use
of internal audit (Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006), this study relied
on prior studies using total number of employees as a measure of firm
size (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Andres & Theissen, 2008; Arnegger et al.,
2014; Beck et al., 2005; Connell, 2001; Hu, 2003; Shalit & Sankar,
1977). However, when using total assets or total revenues as a proxy
of firm size, the ownership determinants did not receive statistically
significant coefficients. Thus, it can be speculated as to what the actual
effects of ownership structure are on the voluntary use of internal
audit. On the other hand, it also creates interesting possibilities for fur-
ther research examining the effects of ownership structure on the vol-
untary use of internal audit. Additional research using a refined model
and variables is needed to fully understand the effect of a firm's own-
ership structure on using internal audit. Furthermore, this study has
not addressed the question of whether the use of internal audit is a
possible reason for the investment decision or follows the investment
decision of a certain type of investor. As suggested in the prior litera-
ture, we must also note the possibility of endogeneity when
interpreting the results of this study (Antle et al., 2006; Brown et al.,
2011; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). The results of this study can be
interpreted in different ways. The shareholder structure might affect
the voluntary use of internal audit, or the specific types of shareholder
might invest in companies with internal audit.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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ENDNOTES
1 The utilities sector was found by Carcello et al. (2010) to be positively
related to internal audit budgets. However, owing to the fact that there
was only one firm representing the utilities sector in our analysis, the sec-
tor was included in the “others” group.
2 A total of 44 of the firms in our sample used internal audit. Nine of these
firms had purchased internal audit services from external service pro-
viders, and 35 firms had their own internal audit function.
3 In this study, a logarithm of the total number of employees was used as a
proxy of size. The results were affected when a natural logarithm of total
assets or natural logarithm of total revenues was used as an alternative
proxy of size. With these alternative proxies of size, the ownership deter-
minants did not receive statistically significant coefficients. The
correlations between the logarithm of total revenues or total assets and
three out of four ownership determinants (state ownership, foreign own-
ership, and dispersion of ownership) were significant at the <0.1 level.
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